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I. INTRODUCTION
Critics have persistently and persuasively attacked the cursory
review courts give to restrictions on first amendment' expression
on government property that courts do not consider a public fo-
rum.2 These critics see a threat to free expression because the Su-
preme Court requires only that the regulation be reasonable,' in-
1. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. L
2. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3460 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (tradition or governmental designation of forum should not be
completely determinative of a citizen's right to speak on public property). See generally
Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L Rav. 1287, 1337 (1979)
(demanding a constitutional right of minimum access to certain government properties
other than streets and parks); Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. Rzv. 1219,
1240 (1984) (calling for careful "focused balancing" of government and first amendment
interests when the government restricts speech in nontraditional public forums); Homing,
The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969 Duxa LJ. 931, 939 (emphasizing that
the first amendment value of furthering individual expression and participation in the polit-
ical process compels broad protection of speech on government property); Stone, Fora
Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Swp. CT. Rzv. 233, 271 (criticizing the limited
scrutiny the Court gave to the prohibition on political speech in city buses allowed in Leh-
man v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974)); Note, The Public Forum: Minimum
Access, Equal Access and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L Rzv. 117, 137 (1975) (The
government cannot automatically deny access to government property not traditionally used
for expression even though the forum is not peculiarly suited to the speaker or the topic.)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Minimum Access); Note, A Unitary Approach to Claims of First
Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 35 STAN. L Rav. 121, 143 (1982) (far-
reaching demand that regulations of speech on all government property meet a "necessary
to a compelling state interest" test) [hereinafter cited as Note, Unitary Approach].
3. Compare the scrutiny given regulations in a public forum where "the rights of the
State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed" with that used for other gov-
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stead of requiring it to pass the more exacting compelling state
interest test the Court applies when the government restricts
speech or when a court determines that the property is a public
forum.' Yet, an equally invidious challenge arises when a trial
court upholds the regulation and the appellate court defers to the
trial court's fact-finding on the public forum issue. This deference
may allow the regulation to escape serious scrutiny both at trial
and on appeal.
Because historical facts are so crucial to support the conclu-
sion that the government designated the property for expression,
any meaningful review requires their independent evaluation."
Such independence is impossible, however, unless the trial judge
provides a thorough and complete account of the historical facts
which support both the public forum label and the intermediate
factual findings that determine whether the label is appropriate.
This particularity allows the appellate court to further refine and
define what it means for government property to be a public fo-
rum. Ironically, the distinctions that appellate courts draw be-
tween varied factual settings when they conduct this process of
elaborating and defining the characteristics of a public forum in-
crease the importance of the trial courts' subsidiary factual
findings.
The appellate court's holding in Planned Parenthood Ass'n/
Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Authority' inevitably raises these
issues and concerns. The court held that Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 52(a)'s "clearly erroneous'" standard governs its review of
factual findings supporting the trial court's conclusion that Chi-
emiment property where limits are valid so long as they are "reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45.46 (1983). See generally Comment,
Constitutional Law: First Amendment Restrictions Upon Nonpublic Forum Need Only Be
Reasonable and Without Discriminatory Intent, 23 WAsBumuaN L.i. 185 (1983). The Court
has never rejected the government's attempt to limit access unless it considered the govern-
ment property to be a public forum.
4. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 529, 640 (1980) (The
Court required that a content-based regulation of speech be a precisely drawn means of
serving a compelling state interest because the Court did not consider the forum govern-
ment property.).
5. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
6. 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985). Other courts have considered different issues arising
from appellate review of public forum cases. See infra note 101.
7. Fzn. R Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility
of witnesses.").
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cago's transit system was a public forum.' Planned Parenthood As-
sociation/Chicago Area (PPA) brought suit in federal court against
the Chicago Transit Authorty (CTA) alleging CTA violated its first
and fourteenth amendments rights by refusing to run PPA's ads
on CTA property.' After a bench trial, the district court issued a
permanent injunction ordering CTA to sell advertising space to
PPA, but the court reserved the issue of damages for later resolu-
tion.10 On appeal, CTA directly challenged the applicability of
Rule 52(a)'s "clearly erroneous" standard of review of the trial
court's findings on the public forum issue. Specifically, CTA chal-
lenged the district court's findings that CTA had previously ac-
cepted "controversial public-issue advertising,"" and that CTA
had no policy against accepting such advertising. The court of ap-
peals held, however, that the clearly erroneous standard did apply
to its review and that there was no clear error.12
CTA used an exclusive agent, Winston Network, Inc., to ac-
cept and place advertising in available CTA space. This space in-
cluded car cards on the interiors of buses and trains. As a matter
of routine, Winston did not seek approval from CTA before ac-
cepting full-rate advertising. Winston often sought such approval,
however, when a nonprofit organization such as PPA wanted to
have its message posted for a nominal rate."s After Winston's re-
quest for advice, CTA rejected a PPA ad which did not mention
abortion,"' and another ad which did refer to PPA's abortion ser-
vice. Although PPA expressed its willingness to pay full rates, CTA
refused to accept the ads.'" CTA defended its rejection as no more,
than applying its "long-standing, consistently-enforced policy...
to reject controversial public-issue advertisements."" The funda-
mental points of disagreement were whether any such policy in
fact existed, and how to characterize the forum's past use. These
factors determine whether the government property is a designated
public forum.' 7
The limited appellate review in Planned Parenthood did not
8. 767 F.2d at 1229.
9. Id. at 1227.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1228.
12. Id. at 1229-30.
13. Id. at 1227.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1227 n.2.
16. Id. at 1227.
17. See infro notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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present an obvious threat to free speech interests precisely because
the plaintiff was successful at trial. The court explicitly acknowl-
edged that this influenced its reasoning by its argument that the
"doctrine of independent review has never been thought to afford
special protection for the government's claim that it has been
wrongly prevented from restricting speech." 18 The question for the
future is whether Rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard will gov-
ern when the trial court denies relief to the free speech claimant.
What if the trial court in Planned Parenthood had concluded that
Chicago did in fact have a consistently enforced policy of accepting
only noncontroversial subjects? PPA could, of course, raise on ap-
peal the legitimacy of this particular limited subject-matter desig-
nation. But more importantly, one must assess the appropriate
standard of review of the trial court's characterization of the fo-
rum's past use as noncontroversial. Is this the sort of factual con-
clusion that merits only limited appellate scrutiny? A final more
broad-based danger is that appellate courts will begin to consider
the "public forum" label itself a factual finding subject only to
Rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard."
This latter danger is present because the Court defines the
public forum label in terms of historical facts.' ° The Court uses an
awkward two-step analysis, which first identifies government prop-
erty as either a forum or a nonforum and then applies a given level
of scrutiny."1 Although courts conduct legal-type balancing when
they scrutinize a regulation of expression on government property,
their decision as to which level of scrutiny to apply turns on histor-
ical facts. Professors Farber and Nowak recently explained how
this approach "distracts attention from the first amendment values
at stake in a given case. It almost certainly will hinder lower court
judges from focusing on those values or from making sense of Su-
18. 767 F.2d at 1229.
19. It is the possibility that courts may see fit to consider the public forum label itself
as a fact or an ultimate fact which presents the most direct challenge to first amendment
values. This would severely restrict the scope of appellate review. See infra notes 72-75 and
accompanying text. See generally Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L
Rav. 229 (1986); Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Com-
parative Analysis, 68 HARv. L Rzv. 70 (1944); Comment, An Analysis of the Application of
the Clearly Erroneous Standard of Rule 52(a) to Findings of Fact in Federal Nonjury
Trials, 53 Ms. LJ. 473 (1983); Note, Supreme Court Review of State Findings of Fact in
Fourteenth Amendment Cases, 14 STAN. L Rav. 328 (1962).
20. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
21. The term "nonforum," which the Court itself has not used, is borrowed from Note,
Unitary Approach, supra note 2, at 127.
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preme Court precedent."' 2 They continued that "public forum doc-
trine is a useful heuristic device-a shorthand method of invoking
this balance of interest. But when the heuristic device becomes the
exclusive method of analysis, only confusion and mistakes re-
sult."'' 8 Another cogent point is that the "criteria upon which the
Court has based its decisions to classify places as public forums or
nonforums, however, do not ensure that restrictions on expression
are necessary to the furtherance of important interests."' 4 Justice
Blackmun discussed these concerns in a recent dissent.25 Critics di-
rect their attack at the complete absence of traditional first
amendment concerns in deciding whether the property is a public
forum.s
II. Bose's IMPACT ON REVIEW OF SUBSIDIARY FACTS
DETERMINATIVE OF SPEECH'S PROTECTION
The Supreme Court's recent treatment of the law-fact dichot-
omy and Rule 52(a) in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States27 further presses upon us the importance of thoughtfully
addressing the appropriate standard of appellate review. The
Court refused to apply the Rule's clearly erroneous standard to a
federal appellate court's review of a finding of actual malice in a
federal bench trial. The Court premised its reasoning on a body of
first amendment precedent mandating that state appellate courts
22. Farber& Nowak, supra note 2, at 1224 (footnote omitted).
23. Id. at 1234-35.
24. Note, Unitary Approach, supra note 2, at 135.36.
25. "Thus, the public forum, limited public forum, and nonpublic forum categories are
but analytical shorthand for the principles that have guided the Court's decisions regarding
claims to access to public property for expressive activity." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3459 (1985)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
26. An analysis of what standard courts should use in reviewing restrictions on expres-
sion on government property is beyond the scope of this paper. For a thorough review of
traditional first amendment values in the public forum context, see Cass, supra note 2, at
1309-16 nn.140-61. A central theme of criticism is that the Court's analysis does not explic-
itly consider the compatibility of expression with the property's dedicated use. For a discus-
sion of how first amendment values require that all access regulations be subject to a com-
pelling state interest test, see Note, Unitary Approach, supra note 2, at 131-35. This would
require access even where expression is incompatible with the property's dedicated use if
the interest served thereby is insufficient to limit speech. Id. at 142. For a discussion of the
view that prohibiting censorship is the core value of the amendment, see Farber & Nowak,
supra note 2, at 1235.
27. 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984). Bose began as a trade libel suit. The defendant, Consumers
Union, published an article critical of the plaintiffs speakers. The article stated that the
sound tended to wander "about the room"; but sitting without a jury, the judge found that
the sound actually moved "along the wall" between the speakers. Id. at 1954. The crucial
issue on appeal was knowledge of this factual "error" by an employee of Bose.
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and the Supreme Court itself independently review the findings of
state courts." Significantly, the Court supported its analogy that
6
28. Id. at 1958, 1960-65. The Court in Bose said that it also conducted an independent
review of a federal court's fact-finding in Time, Inc. v. Pape. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1964-65
(construing Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 269 (1971)). It is true that the Court in Time said
that in "cases in which there is a claim of denial of rights under the Federal Constitution,
this Court is not bound by the conclusions of lower courts, but will re-examine the eviden-
tiary basis on which those conclusions are founded." Time, 401 U.S. at 284. Like Consumers
Union in Bose, Time was the defendant in a libel suit. Yet, the procedural contexts of Bose
and Time are significantly different.
The Court in Time considered the case only after the trial court at the close of evidence
had granted Times's motion for a directed vedict. Id. at 283. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that it was for the jury to decide whether Time acted with actual malice, Id. The
Supreme Court reversed again. In this context, the Court decided as a matter of law that
the evidence "was not enough to create a jury issue of 'malice' . . . ." Id. at 290. Unlike
Bose, the Court in Time did not independently review the evidence as found by a trial court
or jury. Rather, the Court held that given the evidence, no reasonable jury could find the
defendant to have acted with actual malice.
This procedural distinction is not merely academic. In Tavoulareas v. Piro, the court
used it to distinguish Bose. 763 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir.), denying petition for reh'g, 759 F.2d
90 (1985). In Tavoulareas, the trial court had entered a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict after the jury found the defendant had published false material with actual malice.
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In considering the petition for rehear-
ing, the court of appeals said that the defendant "is confronted with an adverse jury verdict
and that the law applicable to judgments notwithstanding the verdict. . .does not confer
free reign to override the credibility findings inherent in the jury verdict. This case is not
like Bose... which involved a bench trial and written findings by the judge." Tavoulareas,
763 F.2d at 1473. In its conclusion, the court cited Time to support its own holding that the
issue is solely "'whether [all the evidence in the record] could constitutionally support a
judgment' for the plaintiff." Id. at 1480 (citing Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 269 (1971)).
If other appellate courts follow Tavoulareas's lead, then Bose will have no impact on
jury trials. But the Court's reasoning potentially has a broader application than just federal
bench trials
The intermingling of law and fact in the actual malice determination is no
greater in state or federal jury trials than in federal bench trials... . And, of
course, the limitation on appellate review of factual determinations under Rule
62(a) is no more stringent that the limitation on federal appellate review of a
jury's factual determination under the Seventh Amendment, which commands
that "no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law."
Bose, 104 8. Ct. at 1964 n.27.
The unsettled question after Bose is whether in a libel suit a jury's factual finding is
reviewed with greater deference than the findings of a federal judge. Although the court in
Tavoulares concluded that it should, Justice Rehnquist said in his dissent in Bose that the
opposite is true in a state jury trial. He said that "it is notable, however, that New York
Times came to this Court from a state court after a jury trial, and thus presented the
strongest case for independent fact-finding by this Court." Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1969 n.2
(emphasis added). He favored independent review of state jury findings due to the "absence
of a distinct 'yes' or 'no' in a general jury verdict as to a particular factual inquiry .... "Id.
The majority in Bose cited Fiske v. Kansas as controlling the review of state court jury
verdicts. Id. at 1964 n.27 (citing Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927)).
And this Court will review the findings of facts by a state court where a federal
right has been denied as the result of a finding shown by the record to be with-
[Vol. 40:307
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independent review should extend to federal bench findings by cit-
out evidence to support it; or where a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and
a finding of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary in order to pass
upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts.
Fiske, 274 U.S. at 385-86.
The jury in a state trial convicted the defendant in Fiske of violating the Kansas Crimi-
nal Syndicalism Act by soliciting members for the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).Id. at 381. The key issue before the Supreme Court was not whether the defendant had
solicited members, but whether the IWW was an organization that taught criminal syndical-ism as defined in Kansas. On this issue the trial judge instructed the jury members thatthey had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the IWW was such an organization.Id. at 383-84. It is unclear which rationale the Court used in Fiske to justify its review. TheCourt noted that the defendant was convicted "without any ...evidence" that the IWW
taught criminal syndicalism. Id. at 387. But the Court also alluded to the intermingling oflaw and fact in this issue when it said the finding was unjustified "either as an inference of
law or fact. ... Id. at 386.
Whatever the holding of Fiske, the Court in Bose construed it as justifying independent
review of state court decisions where issues of fact and law are intermingled. It is crucial to
note that nothing in Fiske justifies independent review of subsidiary factual findings which
are not somehow "ntermingled." A case arising out of the state courts which is factually
similar to Bose should not be subject to independent review as allowed in Fiske if JusticeRehnquist was correct on two points. He suggested first that the precedents of independent
review cited by the majority were at best examples of such intermingled findings, and sec-
ond, that the real issue in Bose was the historical fact of the defendant's knowledge without
an intermingled component.
Justice Rehnquist distinguished the cases used by the majority to support independent
review of the actual malice issue. The "obscenity and child pornography cases.., and casesinvolving words inciting anger or violence . . more clearly involve the kind of mixed ques-tions of fact and law which call for de novo appellate review than do the -New York Times
'actual malice' cases, which simply involve questions of pure historical fact." Bose, 104 S. Ct.
at 1969 h. Not only is his characterization of these precedents defensible, but also some ofthese cases do not legitimately support the proposition that the Court independently re-
viewed any factual finding.
The Court in Bose cited the obscenity case Miller v. California as precedent fo- inde-pendent factual review. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1963 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15(1973)). Although the Court in Miller reviewed the defendant's conviction in a state jury
trial for distributing obscene material, the Court did not independently review facts. Miller,413 U.S. at 17. Instead, the Court independently reviewed the constitutionality of "a statelaw that regulates obscene material. ... Id. at 25. It is also questionable whether theCourt has ever really independently reviewed facts in the libel setting. For example, Time
was a directed verdict requiring no independent review of its facts on appeal.
The Court in Bose cited another libel case, Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy. Bose, 104 S. Ct.
at 1965 (citing Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971)). In Monitor, the Court
reviewed a jury verdict that the defendant had committed libel. Monitor, 401 U.S. at 270.But the Court held that the trial court had improperly charged the jury and thus the juryhad not necessarily applied the New York Times standard to an official running for public
office. Id. at 277. (referring to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). Evenin New York Times, the Court's primary holding was a matter of law and not a review offacts. The Court held that the common law doctrine of libel per se was unconstitutional as
applied. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 267. Only in applying its new actual malice standarddid the Court analyze the facts. Its conclusion that the defendant had not acted with actual
malice could not have been an independent review of the jury's findings, because the jury
never even considered the actual malice issue. Id. at 285-86.
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ing key cases from the public forum area.29 Bose, then, directly
The Court also offered the public forum case of Edwards v. South Carolina as support-
ing the independent review of factual findings. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1962-64 (citing Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)). In Edwards the factual findings were not in issue
because there "was no substantial conflict in the trial evidence." Edwards, 372 U.S. at 230.
The real thrust of the Court's holding in Edwards was that as a matter of law the "Four-
teenth Amendment does not permit a state to make criminal the peaceful expression of
unpopular views." Id. at 237.
These criticisms of the Court's use of some precedents do not mean that the Court in
Bose was unable to offer genuine precedents to support its independent review of state court
findings. Indeed, the Court independently reviewed the whole record in later cases in both
the areas of obscenity and the public forum. In Jenkins v. Georgia, the Court independently
reviewed the state jury's finding that the film "Carnal Knowledge" was obscene. Bose, 104 S.
Ct. at 1963 (citing Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974)). The Court reversed the defen-
dant's conviction "even though a properly charged jury unanimously agreed on a verdict of
guilty." Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 161. In Cox v. Louisiana the Court drew its own inferences
despite a genuinely conflicting record of the facts. 379 U.S. 536, 540 n.1, 541 n.2, 546 n.9
(1965). To these one can add, as Justice Rehnquist did, the cases involving words inciting
anger or violence: Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576
(1969).
Yet simply acknowledging that there is precedent for independent review does not
mean that it supports the Court's reasoning in Bose. Justice Rehnquist's proposition seems
on point that the obscenity and fighting words cases are examples of "intermingled" fact
and law issues. The legal standard is linguistically incapable of being sufficiently specific so
as to render the issue factual. But a central theme of this note is that the Court in Bose
actually conducted an independent review of the historical fact of the defendant's knowl-
edge of the statement's falsity. Two responses are possible. The first is that despite the
precedential legitimacy of Bose, it still stands as an example of subsidiary fact review.
The second response may actually shore up the legitimacy of extending independent
review of subsidiary facts to the public forum setting. As mentioned above, uhe Court in Cox
independently reviewed a factual record fraught with conflicting versions of the historical
facts. Cox is a formative public forum case. See infra note 29. Cox is one of the best exam-
ples of the Court using its independent judgment to draw inferences that are not "intermin-
gled" findings of fact and law. In this civil rights protest case, a judge sitting without a jury
convicted the defendants of disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and court-
house picketing. Cox, 379 U.S. at 538. The Court simply could not use the Edwards solution
and label the defendant's conduct peaceful and therefore automatically protected. The
Court first had to characterize the defendant's conduct based upon a conflicting record.
"Estimates of the crowd's size varied from 1,500 to 3,800." Id. at 540 n.1. "There were con-
flicting versions in the record as to the time the demonstration would take .... " id. at 541
n.2. "The cheering and shouting were described differently by different witnesses ...." Id.
at 546 n.9. The Court's thorough review of these historical facts indicated that restrictions
on speech on government property required the Court to draw its own inferences from the
record.
29. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1962-64 (explaining the duty to make an independent examina-
tion of the whole record recognized in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) and
later in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)). See supra note 28. For a colorful description
of these early civil rights protest cases, see Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox
v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 4-10 [hereinafter cited as Kalven, Public Forum]. Profes-
sor Kalven displayed remarkable prescience in predicting that the vigorous defense of free
speech found in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan would "find its exuberant formula put to
hard tests when the speech is in public places." Id. at 3 (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964)). See also Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
[Vol. 40:307
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raises the possibility that independent review is also appropriate in
the public forum context.
The Court in Bose conducted an independent review of the
historical or pure fact of the defendant's knowledge of the state-
ment's falsity.30 Were the Court to defer to the trial court's finding
on this issue, appellate review would be nearly perfunctory because
such knowledge is sufficient to find actual malice. 1 Yet, the
Court's decision to forego the clearly erroneous standard is all the
more remarkable because Rule 52(a) commands that "due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the
credibility of the witness. '32 In the public forum context certain
historical facts have likewise become essentially determinative of
whether the public forum label is appropriate. 3 Bose provides
strong precedent for conducting a thorough appellate review of
even subsidiary facts which are crucial in defining the protection
afforded speech. Independent review is only appropriate when the
trial court rejects the free speech claim because its purpose is to
protect first amendment values. It is not so clear, however, that
Bose can be read so narrowly. Bose may actually allow the party
opposing the free speech claim to demand independent review
when it is unsuccessful at trial.3 4 The key precedents speak,
though, of a denial of constitutional rights below."
the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. Rzv. 191 [hereinafter cited as Kalven, New York
Times Case].
30. The Court admitted that "the actual malice determination rests entirely on an eval-
uation of Seligson's [defendant's employee] state of mind when he wrote his initial report,
or when he checked the article against that report." Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1956. The Court also
said that it does "not stretch the language of the rule to characterize an inquiry into what a
person knew at a given time as a question of 'fact'" Id. at 1958. For a discussion of the
central issue in Bose, see supra note 27. See also Comment, The Expanding Scope of Ap-
pellate Review in Libel Cases-The Supreme Court Abandons the Clearly Erroneous Stan-
dard of Review for Findings of Actual Malice, 36 MERCER L. Ray. 711, 727 (1985).
The court in Tavoulareas v. Piro did not interpret Bose as requiring an appellate court
to independently review subsidiary factual findings. 763 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir.), denying peti-
tion for reh'g, 759 F.2d 90 (1985). This holding may be limited to an appellate court's review
of directed verdicts in jury trials. See supra note 28. In Tavoulareas the court said that "it
is the application of the rule (the constitutional function) rather than the finding of subsidi-
ary facts to which Bose primarily speaks." Id. at 1480. Whether or not Tavoulareas is cor-
rect in its reading of Bose, the court does correctly narrow the issue as to "how deep into the
initial fact finding process an appellate court must delve in a libel appeal." Id. at 1479.
31. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286 (1964).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
33. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
34. Monaghan, supra note 19, at 245.
35. See Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1958, 1960-65. In the public forum context appellate courts
have been more likely to independently review factual findings where a trial court has de-
nied a first amendment claim. See infra note 101.
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The text of Rule 52(a) itself forces the federal courts to cate-
gorize issues as either fact or law." A more detailed analysis of the
status and history of public forum doctrine is necessary, of course,
before one can coherently decide whether it is law or fact to con-
sider government property a public forum. Only then is it appro-
priate to consider the "vexing nature""7 of the law or fact issue.
This latter inquiry will undoubtedly benefit, however, by eschew-
ing the somewhat metaphysical deduction traditionally associated
with these limited categories and more concretely analyzing the
policy implications of either label. Choosing the factual label not
only means limited appellate review, but also halts the process of
further elaborating and defining the attributes of a public forum."
Policy favors keeping the ultimate label "public forum" a mat-
ter of law subject to plenary reivew so that appellate courts can
continue to define what it means for property to be a public forum.
Yet, crucial intermediate factual findings can effectively prohibit
an appellate court from calling the property a public forum. The
Court's reasoning in Bose provides strong precedent for indepen-
dent review of even these subsidiary facts or inferences because the
protection given to speech varies significantly and directly upon
these findings.3 It is crucial to remember that while Rule 52(a)
applies only to federal bench trials, the categorization as either law
or fact has implications for other forums and procedural contexts.'
III. PUBLIc FORUM PRECEDENT
PPA did not argue that the car cards in CTA's buses and
trains are a traditional public forum.' 1 These traditional forums
such as streets and parks, "have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public, and time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
36. Fun. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (clearly erroneous standard applies only to those findings prop-
erly classified as facts).
37. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1960 (1984)
(citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1981), which in turn cites Baumgart-
ner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944)). Unfortunately this particular line of prece-
dent has contributed nothing to resolving the problem and it has probably done more dam-
age by its treatment of ultimate facts. See infra note 83.
38. Se infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 28. See generally Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-
Fact Distinction, 65 CAUw. L REv. 1020 (1967); Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-
Fact Distinction, 54 CALF. L Rzv. 1020 (1966).
41. Planned Parenthood, 767 F.2d at 1231.
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and discussing public questions."' It is only in these traditional
forums that a constitutional right of minimum access has
evolved.' 3 The traditional forum can never be completely closed
because "the government may not prohibit all communicative ac-
tivity."4' Courts carefully scrutinize all regulations of speech, and
even those "of the time, place and manner of expression which are
content-neutral" must still be "narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant government interest, and to leave open alternative channels of
communication. '
'
4
5
The key feature distinguishing a traditional public forum from
a nontraditional or designated forum is that there is never a con-
stitutional right of access to the latter. The government is neither
"required to create the forum in the first place," nor "required to
indefinitely retain the open character of the facility . . . ."I In-
deed, the history of public forum doctrine indicates that the con-
cept at its core is only related to the constitutional right of access
principle.' 7 Ironically, the appellate court in Perry Local Educa-
42. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). See Kalven, Public Forum, 8upra note 29,
at 12-13 (contrasting this early dicta with that found in Davis'V. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43
(1897)). Davis allowed the government the power to exclude all expression on government
property, while Hague opened the door to a constitutional right of minimum access. Profes-
sor Kalven found the Court giving impressive content to the Hague dicta in the early hand-
bill cases. See also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (Clean streets are an insufficient
government interest to prohibit handbill distribution.); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413
(1943) (Distribution of handbills by a Jehovah's Witness accompanied by solicitation of con-
tributions is not commercial expression and the government may not prohibit it.).
43. In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, the Court unfortunately said
that a "constitutional right of access" can be claimed for expression on an opened subject
matter in a limited public forum. 460 U.S. 37, 48 (1983). Yet there is no denying that the
government can prohibit all expression in the forum by closing it for all expression. See
infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. In many of the public forum cases upholding the
right of expression, the Court actually relied upon procedural grounds instead of a minimum
access theory. See Note, Minimum Access, supra note 2, at 121-25 (Hague v. CIO, 307 US.
496 (1939) (overbreadth); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (vagueness); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (vagueness); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (se-
lective prosecution)); see also Cass, supra note 2, at 1298-99. But see United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179 (1983) (prohibition of expression on sidewalks surrounding the
Supreme Court is unconstitutional because sidewalks, "generally without further inquiry,"
are public forum property); Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (1983) (government cannot close the
streets and parks to expression).
44. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
45. Id. See also Note, Time, Place and Manner Regulations of Expressive Activities in
the Public Forum, 61 NEB. L REv. 167 (1982).
46. Id. at 45-46. For an example of the greater latitude given to government in these
regulations, see infra note 62. See generally Note, The Public Forum and the First Amend-
ment: The Puzzle of the Podium, 19 NEw ENG. L. REv. 619 (1983-1984); Note, Minimum
Access, supra note 2.
47. This proposition follows from the fact that the public forum doctrine developed in
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tors' Ass'n v. Holt' 8 attempted to simplify the terminology by lim-
iting the public forum label to claims of absolute access, not equal
access. 4 The Supreme Court rejected this approach, however, and
held that the concept applies to claims for equal access to forums
whose open character is dependent upon the state's goodwill.
If a forum's past use indicates that the government indeed
opened or designated the forum for expressive activity, the govern-
ment "is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional
public forum."' "e The inquiry into whether the government has
opened its property is not as simple as it might sound. The Court
reasons that a "public forum may be created for a limited purpose
such as use by certain groups, (student groups) or for the discus-
sion of certain subjects (school board business)."' 1 In Perry Educa-
tion Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,5" the Court uses the
term "opened" in discussing a "forum generally open to the pub-
lic," but it uses "created" in analyzing permissible subject-matter
restrictions. Nevertheless, a fair reading of Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights5 leads one to conclude that the government may
response to claims for access to government property, not just claims of equal access. This is
especially clear in the handbill cases where the Court held the prohibitions unconstitutional
even though they would have banned all speakers. See supra note 42. A flat ban on access
can, however, have a differential affect on expression of viewpoints on a particular subject
matter. Where the government excludes the poor from government property their views may
not be heard elsewhere. Accord Karet, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amend-
ment, 43 U. CHL L Ray. 964 (1975) (The general thrust of Karst's argument runs against
minimum access in favor of equal treatment of different viewpoints. Yet, he takes a broad
view of what this equal treatment compels and denies that a prohibition would be legitimate
if it served to effectively silence a particular viewpoint.); see Horning, supra note 2, at 939.
One could fashion a theory requiring guaranteed minimum access only when a prohibition
effectively accomplished viewpoint discrimination.
48 662 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981).
49. "Convention has established the term "public forum" to denote a facility that may
not constitutionally be closed to all private expression, but the absence of a natural phrase
to describe a facility that the government may not open only to certain speakers or view-
points has led some courts to use the same or confusingly similar phrases in that context as
well." Id. at 1293.
50. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. These same standards, however, do not amount to a constitu-
tional right of access such that the government could not prohibit all expression.
51. Id. at 46 n.7 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 45, 46 n.7.
53. 418 U.S. 298, 300 (1974). It is not at all obvious that the forum was not in a sense
"created" only for commercial advertising. The city had never carried anything other than
commercial advertising and it had never accepted a political advertisement. The Court em-
phasized that administrative concerns justified this decision. Yet, if the city had begun by
accepting political advertisements and later concluded that these same problems demanded
that it accept only commercial ads, Lehman would clearly allow it to do so. This would
permit the city to open the forum only for a limited subject matter by closing it to others
even though the city did not originally create it with such a limit.
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open a forum only to limited subject matters although it did not
"create" the forum for expression on only certain subjects. The
Court in Lehman allowed the city to prohibit all political advertis-
ing from its public transportation system."4
Given the Court's approach to determining whether the gov-
ernment has opened a forum for a limited subject matter, the key
issue becomes solely historical and descriptive: has the government
opened or designated the forum for expression? A court need not
generally assess the government's reasons for having chosen only
certain subject matters because, in the final analysis, the govern-
ment may exclude all subjects from a nontraditional forum. This is
not to say, however, that it is not the Court's role to say which
subject-matter restrictions are per se illegal. In Lehman, the Court
did have to initially approve of the city's consistently enforced
written policy of accepting only commercial ads and rejecting all
political and public-issue advertising from its public transportation
system."' Yet, once the Court gives its approval to a particular sub-
ject-matter restriction in a given setting, future courts need only
identify the forum's past use and determine whether the govern-
ment has opened it for expression.
A history of access open to the public, however, is sometimes
insufficient to label property a public forum. The access must be
for expression, not simply for milling about. In Greer v. Spock"
there were consistently enforced regulations prohibiting partisan
political speech on a military base. This ban evidenced the govern-
ment's desire not to designate the property as a public forum. Con-
sequently, the Court held the public had not traditionally used the
property for expression, although the government had traditionally
allowed the public access to the property.
The Court's recent holding in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense and Education Fund,67 however, calls into question the very
existence of the limited public forum concept. In dissent, Justice
54. By allowing the city to ban all political advertising, the Court in Lehman held that
advertising on city buses and trains is not a traditional public forunl See infra notes 91-95
and accompanying text. The Court also held that in this particular setting the city had not
designated the medium as a nontraditional public forum. The court in Planned Parenthood
seized upon this distinction to distinguish Lehman. "While Lehman stands for the proposi-
tion that the interior of a transit system's cars and buses is not a traditional public forum, it
does not stand for the proposition that such space may never become a public forum."
Planned Parenthood, 767 F.2d at 1233.
55. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304.
56. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
57. 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985).
1985]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Blackmun charged that "[t]he Court's analysis. . flies in the face
of the decisions in which the Court has identified property as a
limited public forum, and empties the limited public forum con-
cept of all its meaning."" The Court in Cornelius labeled the Com-
bined Federal Campaign, a charity drive aimed at federal employ-
ees, a nonpublic forum.5 It rejected the notion that the
government designated a limited forum for the subject-matter of
charitable solicitation. The Court reasoned that because the gov-
ernment had always limited participation in the drive to "appro-
priate" agencies, this traditionally selective approach to access
failed to evidence the government's intention to designate a public
forum for the broader category of all charitable orgainzations.60
This argument fails to deflect the dissent's charge that the federal
government created a limited forum."
IV. PUBLIC FORUM: LAW OR FACT
Once the Court labels the government property as either a
public forum or nonforum, the reasoning employed by the Court in
defining the scope of permissible regulations of speech is purely
legal. 6" It is out and out value balancing of the competing state and
58. Id. at 3456.
59. Id. at 3451.
60. Id. at 3450-61.
61. Id. at 3460-61. Justice Blackmun sees the Court's reasoning as inconsistent with
precedents requiring access even though there was a history of allowing expression on only a
selective basis. The theater, in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, limited use of its
facilities to "clean, healthful entertainment ... ." 420 U.S. 546, 549 n4 (1976). Similarly,
the university, in Widmar v. Vincent, had a policy restricting access to only registered non-
religious groups. 464 U.S. 263 (1981). Perhaps what the Court really indicated in Southeast-
ern and Widnar is that these particular narrow subject-matter restrictions (healthful en-
tertainment and nonreligious groups) are per se unconstitutional. It then held that the
government had designated the forums for the broader subject-matters of entertainment
and student groups. Even so, it is impossible to see how the Court avoided the conclusion
that the government opened the CFC for groups seeking charitable contributions or, alter-
natively, for the subject-matter of charitable solicitation.
Calling the CFC a limited public forum would require strict scrutiny of all challenges
raised by groups denied access. The Court was most probably concerned that it simply could
not establish any judicially principled way to distinguish between those seeking access. This
is a very real concern. Yet, this simply highlights the fundamental weakness of pigeon-hol-
ing government property into the categories of forum or nonforum.
62. The balancing process is especially clear once the Court has determined the type of
forum with which it is dealing. For discussion of the explicit balancing that accompanied the
Court's invalidation of laws restricting leaflet distribution on public streets, see Kalven,
Public Forum, supra note 29, at 16-21. Compare Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162
(1939) (Keeping "the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordi-
nance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one
willing to receive it.") with Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
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first amendment interests. The initial classification as a public fo-
rum or nonforum only alters the weights in the scales." Yet, the
initial classification as a public forum is not so clearly a matter of
balancing. The definitions of both traditional and nontraditional"
public forums raise other issues. The traditional use and designa-
tion tests outlined in Perrya invite the trial court to conduct a
factual inquiry. A trial court must search for evidence on two cru-
cial issues: the forum's past use for expression and government
policies to designate it for this use. If the results of this archeologi-
cal dig fail to convince the trial court that the government prop-
erty is a public forum, the court will give government regulations
very limited scrutiny."
Because Rule 52(a) applies only to findings of fact, it compels
the determination of whether it is a question of fact or law to label
government property a public forum. When the Court rejects a
plea for access to government property it clearly indicates that a
traditional forum does not exist because there would be a constitu-
tional right of access.67 Consequently, one can say with some assur-
ance that jailgrounds,as city transit cars,6' military bases,7 0 let-
terboxes,7' utility poles,7 grounds of the Supreme Court other
than sidewalks," internal school mail systems,1' meet and confer
sessions, 78 and the Combined Federal Campaign" are not tradi-
tional public forums. Yet once the Court makes these legal deter-
452 U.S. 640 (1981) (Court approved of regulations limiting distribution of literature to
booths at state fair); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118,
2134 (1984) (Court upheld ban on posting signs on city utility poles based upon city's aes-
thetic concerns although property not considered a public forum).
63. See supra note 3.
64. The term "nontraditional" is not used in Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). A nontraditional public forum is government property which
the government has opened or designated for expressive activities. The government has not,
in a long tradition, devoted it to assembly and debate. The government need not indefinitely
retain the open character of the forum. See id. at 46.
65. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
66. See supra note 3.
67. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
68. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
69. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
70. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
71. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114
(1981).
72. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
73. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
74. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
75. Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 104 S. Ct. 1058 (1984).
76. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985).
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minations, other courts have a simpler job of inquiring whether the
property fits into one of these categories such that a ban on all
access is legitimate. 7 The same is true for the streets and parks,
property the Court has identified as traditional public forums.7 s It
is at this point that the trial court's factual categorization of the
property becomes one with the traditional public forum label.
In traditional public forums the Court has so clearly defined
the applicable properties that the public forum designation ap-
pears factual. Years of norm elaboration have established clear-cut
rules of decision. Consequently, Rule 52(a) could restrict review of
this "ultimate fact," as well as the subsidiary facts underlying it.7
The appellate court in McCreary v. Stone did just that when it
held that "the finding that [the government property] is a public
forum is not clearly erroneous."' "e Because the property involved
was a park, a traditional forum, the legal standard is quite pre-
cise.81 Yet, the inevitable but surprisingly subtle issue arose as to
what exactly is a park within this standard. There was a war me-
morial on the property and the village of Scarsdale had denied
most applications for first amendment access.8s As in Planned
Parenthood, the challenge to free speech arises in the future. The
trial court could hold that the property is not a "park" and conse-
quently not a public forum, leaving the appellate court to evaluate
this finding under the clearly erroneous standard.
The law or fact issue is important, but the Court's discussion
of the distinction in Bose is confusing and inconsistent." After
77. See supro note 56 and accompanying text.
7& Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
79. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1959-60 (1984)
("Rule 52(a) applies to findings of fact, including those described as 'ultimate facts' because
they may determine the outcome of litigation."). For a discussion of the uneven treatment
of ultimate facts, see infro note 83.
80. McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 722 (2d Cir. 1984), aof'd sub nom. Board of Trust-
ees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
S1. Parks, like sidewalks, "are among those areas of public property that traditionally
have been held open to the public for expressive activities and are clearly within those areas
of public property that may be considered, generally without further inquiry, to be public
forum property." United States v. Grace, 461 US. 171, 179 (1983).
82. McCreary v. Stone, 575 F. Supp. 1112, 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
S3. 104 S. CL 1949 (1984). The Court in Bose said that Rule 52(a) covers "ultimate"
facts. See supra note 79. For this proposition, Bose cites Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U.S. 273, 287 (1982). Bose continued with the proposition that mixed findings of law and
fact are not covered by Rule 52(a). Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1960 (citing Inwood Laboratories, Inc.
v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 n.15 (1982)). Yet Inwood flatly does not support
this proposition. Indeed, the Court in Pullman specifically refused to decide the relationship
between Rule 52(a) and mixed questions of law and fact. 456 U.S. at 289 n.19. To this
extent, Bose makes an important admission in removing mixed questions of law and fact
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reading the Court's analysis, it seems perfectly appropriate to
choose either label to identify a public forum. To its credit, how-
ever, the Court acknowledges the real matter at issue in choosing
either label: what is the appropriate level of appellate review? "Re-
garding certain largely factual questions in some areas of the law,
the stakes-in terms of impact on future cases and future con-
duct-are too great to entrust them finally to the judgment of the
trier of fact." 4 This flexibility is possible only by making another
candid observation on the failure of legal reasoning to discern a
workable definition for law and fact. "A finding of fact in some
cases is inseparable from the legal principles through which it was
deduced."8 Others have argued that there is a fundamental inco-
herence in the distinction. 6
This latter problem has unquestionably materialized in at-
tempting to implement the Court's two-step public forum doctrine.
In Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,s7 the Court
was unable to articulate why city utility poles were not traditional
public forums, but it allowed a flat ban on posting signs on them.
Vincent highlights the underlying tension between fact and law in
the public forum context:
Just as it is not dispositive to label the posting of signs on public
property as a discrete medium of expression, it is also of limited
utility in the context of this case to focus on whether the tangi.
ble property itself should be deemed a public forum. Generally
an analysis of whether property is a public forum provides a
from Rule 52(a)'s coverage, The Rule generally covers ultimate facts, but not mixed ques-
tions of fact and law. The issue then becomes one of discerning a difference between the
two.
Pullman labels intentional discrimination a pure fact which is reviewable only under
Rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 286-87 n.16. In analyzing Baumgartner v.
United States, Pullman distinguishes Baumgartner's holding that "ultimate facts" are inde-
pendently reviewable because these facts clearly imply the application of standards of law.
Id. (construing Baumgartner, 322 U.S. 665 (1944)). This is evidently in contrast to the find-
ing of intent which is strictly historical and descriptive, requiring no law application. Yet,
Pullman also says that the issue of whether a court correctly applies a rule of law to estab-
lished facts is a matter of mixed law and fact. Id. at 289 n.19. Within Pullman's own lan-
guage then, law application results in ultimate facts and is also a mixed question of law and
fact. Rule 52(a) covers the former and not the latter.
84. Bose, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1960 n.17.
85. Id.
86. See Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L Rsv. 229, 233 n.24 (1985).
In Bose, the Court also mentions L GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930). 104 S. Ct. at 1960-61
nn.20-21.
87. 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984). See also Note, Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Temporary Sign Posting on Public Property
to Advance Local Aesthetic Concerns, 34 DE PAUL L. REv. 197 (1984).
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workable analytic tool. However, . . . "the question of whether
a particular piece of personal or real property, owned or con-
trolled by the government is in fact a public forum may blur at
the edges. .... "
The Court based its decision to waive the usual initial inquiry
into whether the property is "in fact" a public forum upon unar-
ticulated considerations. Yet, the decision to forego the test is le-
gal, although of limited precedential value because the Court did
not really explain why it did so. The Court is undoubtedly aware
that "anterior to law application a crucial policy decision must be
made: Should a further effort at norm elaboration be under-
taken?"'8 The Court's answer in Vincent was no, but it empha-
sized that the real party at interest was the one to whom the Court
allocated the law application and elaboration function.'0 The Court
in Vincent chose not to give further definition to the traditional
public forum label. Yet, it is perfectly clear that utility poles on
government property are not traditional forums because the Court
would have required minimum access for expression. Although it
did not explain itself, the Court did give further meaning to the
traditional public forum label -by identifying property which does
not qualify. From this perspective one can see how new factual set-
tings give meaning to legal terms whether or not a court conducts
explicit norm elaboration.
In dealing with claims for absolute or minimum access, the
Court has already allowed the government to place a number of
properties off limits.' 1 These properties are clearly not traditional
forums. The inquiry into whether the government has opened or
dedicated nontraditional property for expression generally or on
limited subject-matters has also taken on an historical and factual
flavor." Yet, the Court makes it clear in Cornelius v. NAACP Le-
88. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2134 n.32 (emphasis added).
89. Monaghan, supra note 86, at 236-37.
90. Commentators have long recognized that the identification of law application is a
discrete function not neatly fitting into the law and fact categories. See Bohlen, Mixed
Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L Rzv. 111 (1924). Professor Bohlen recognized that a
jury's finding of negligence is neither law nor fact. Instead, the jury gives content to a "pre-
existing broadly stated law by making it capable of application to the facts of specific liti-
gated cases, and may be properly termed 'administrative.'" Id. at 115. There is a modern
realization that the decision of which actor applies the law is a matter of policy. See Weiner,
The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 C"uw. L. Rzv. 1867, 1876 (1966);
Monaghan, supra note 86, at 235.
91. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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gal Defense and Education Fund" that the test is not as
"mechanical" as the traditional public forum inquiry. The Court in
Cornelius did, however, further define the governing norms when
the government designates property, and it therefore made this de-
termination hinge even further upon the trial court's fact-finding.' 4
The difficulty is that just because the Court identifies a particular
property as not a nontraditional public forum, it does not mean
that type of property cannot ever become a nontraditional public
forum. The nontraditional label hinges upon the government
designating the property for expression. This inquiry is specific to
each setting.' 6
The choice between a law or fact label for the public forum
issue implicates important policy considerations. By picking the
fact label, courts will "avoid rigidity and the danger that standards
and rules which, at the time they were enacted seem [sic] useful or
necessary, may become impracticable and ridiculous under
changed conditions."" If labeled a factual matter which a jury
might eventually consider, we are assured that the "decision of a
jury determines the standard for the one case, and for that case
only.' 7 Yet, the law designation is preferable where we desire uni-
formity, predictability, and further norm elaboration. There is par-
ticularly strong reason to reserve the issue as legal where certain
historical facts are likely to recur." In the public forum context
this is certainly the case because certain types of government prop-
erty repeatedly cause controversy and some rules of decision re-
flecting the interests at stake would directly affect future behav-
ior."9 This is true for both traditional and nontraditional forums.
V. ANOTHER LOOK AT DETERMINATIVE FACTS AND RULE 52(a)
The above discussion of law and fact supports the conclusions
93. 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985). See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
94. Cornelius's "selective access" test to determine whether the property is a nontradi-
tional public forum further defines what it means for government to designate a public fo-
rum. The trial court's job is then to assess the historical facts and decide whether access was
selective. In this way the historical facts necessary to determine that a designated public
forum exists become crucial. If it is a fact that access was selective, then it necessarily fol-
lows that there was not an intention to designate a public forum.
95. See supro note 54.
96. See Bohlen, supra note 90, at 115.
97. Id. at 116.
98. See Monaghan, supra note 86, at 268; Weiner, supra note 90, at 1924.
99. For the most exhaustive exercise at formulating rules of decision for specific proper-
ties, see Cass, supro note 2, at 1337-54.
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that policy counsels against calling the public forum label some
sort of ultimate fact within Rule 52(a)'s domain, and that the
Court's discussion of ultimate facts and Rule 52(a) is flexible
enough to support this approach. Yet, as discussed above, the
Court has refined just exactly which historical facts are necessary
to support the public forum label. 1°° To this extent the historical
facts themselves become of crucial concern and essentially deter-
minative of whether a public forum label is appropriate. The find-
ing that prior access was selective within Cornelius's meaning is
certainly one step closer to an historical fact than it is to law
application.
This brings to the forefront perhaps the most crucial issue:
shall we limit review of these facts which are nearly dispositive of
the public forum label to Rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard?
This issue is present in both the findings that public property is a
"park," and that the government limited access to only appropri-
ate groups in a nontraditional forum. It would have been present
in Planned Parenthood had the trial court concluded that Chicago
did have a policy of accepting only noncontroversial advertise-
ments. Only a few federal appellate courts have considered the ap-
propriate standard of appellate review of various issues in public
forum settings. 10°
100. See supro notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
101. The court, in Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., specifically men-
tioned Bose and the need for an appellate court to conduct an independent review in cases
raising first amendment issues. 749 F.2d 893, 897 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The district court
upheld the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's (WMATA) rejection of a
poster critical of President Reagan. Id. at 894. There was no dispute at trial or on appeal,
however, that subway advertising had become a ptblic forum. Id. at 894 n.2. The district
court agreed with WMATA that the poster was deceptive and distorted and therefore not
protected by the first amendment even in a public forum. Id. at 894. The appellate court
conducted an independent review of the deceptiveness of the poster. The court likened de-
ceptiveness to those facts described by the Court in Bose which are inseparable from the
principles from which the Court deduced them. Id. at 897 n.9.
The court used similar reasoning in Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d
538 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 1167 (1985). The court explicitly stated that it
would not be bound by the factual inferences drawn by the trial court based upon Bose's
discussion of first amendment values. Id. at 542 n.3. The trial court entered a summary
judgment for a student religious group seeking to meet during a regularly scheduled activity
period. Id. at 541. The court of appeals reversed.
Many years of litigation over access to city welfare offices ended in New York City
Unemployed & Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 742 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1984). The plaintiff was
a group which the government had banned from soliciting memberships in welfare offices.
The group sought to educate welfare recipients as to their legal rights. Id. at 719. After the
trial court originally entered judgment for the defendants, the court of appeals vacated and
remanded on the solicitation ban issue. 677 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1982). The court identified the
welfare office as a public forum for the purposes of speech pertaining to welfare issues and
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There is a definite relationship between which limited subject-
matters or groups are permissible as a matter of law and the ap-
propriate level of appellate review. The Supreme Court has not de-
cided the permissibility of allowing only "noncontroversial" speak-
ers to use government property.'"2 The Court's decision in
Cornelius to allow the government to restrict the Combined Fed-
eral Campaign to only "appropriate" groups strikes a close parallel.
Both designations are inherently subjective and give the govern-
ordered the trial court to consider whether there was a less restrictive alternative than a
complete ban on solicitations. Id. at 239. On its second look at this dispute, the appellate
court held that the trial court's finding that there was no less restrictive alternative than a
ban on solicitation is a finding of fact reviewable only under Rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous
standard. Brezenoff, 742 F.2d at 722.
In White House Vigil for ERA Comm. v. Clark, the court held that the narrowness of a
"time, place and manner" regulation is a legal issue which Rule 52(a) does not cover. 746
F.2d 1518, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The appellate court reversed the district court which had
struck down as unconstitutional regulations governing demonstrations on the sidewalks in
front of the White House. The dissent, however, said the finding that the regulations were
unnecessarily restrictive is factual and should be reviewed only under the clearly erroneous
standard. Id. at 1542-43 (Wald, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court's reasoning in Bose
played some part in Judge Wald's conclusion. Id. at 1543 n.1.
In Glasson v. City of Louisville, the court did not use Rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous
standard to review the good faith and. reasonable conduct of a policeman. 518 F.2d 899, 903
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975). The district court found that the police-
man acted reasonably by destroying a poster critical of the President of the United States as
the plaintiff awaited the President's motorcade. d. at 902. The court of appeals said that
"determinations, whether called ultimate facts or conclusions of law, that attach legal signif-
icance to historical facts may be reyersed if upon examination of the record they are found
to be erroneous." Id. at 903.
After the district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, the court of appeals, in
Guzick v. Drebus, said it was not bound by Rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard. 431 F.2d
594, 599 (6th Cir. 1970). The plaintiff sought to wear an antiwar button in school, but the
court of appeals denied his right to do so by distinguishing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
102. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad most directly raised the issue, but the
Court chose to frame its holding as deciding only that there had been an unconstitutional
prior restraint. 420 U.S. 546, 552 (1975). See Karst, Public Enterprises and the Public Fo-
rum: A Comment on Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIo ST. L.J. 246 (1976).
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, the Court allowed the city to ban political adver-
tising and to "limit car card space to innocuous and less controversial commercial and ser-
vice oriented advertising ...." 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974). The holding, however, does not
indicate that the Court permitted the city to accept only the subset of "less controversial"
commercial advertisements. In context, the Court in Lehman used the modifier "less contro-
versial" only in comparison with partisan political advertisements.
In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, the Court held unconstitutional a
regulation which would have prevented the utility from discussing nuclear power, but not
topics that are not "controversial issues of public policy." 447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980). The key
distinction, however, is that the Court considered the forum (billing envelopes) to be the
utility's "own" property, not government property. See supra note 4. For the impact of
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985), see text accompa-
nying note 94.
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ment great freedom to choose those who can participate in the fo-
rum. The trial court in Planned Parenthood made separate find-
ings that Chicago had no such policy and that the government had
not used the forum only for noncontroversial topics. The latter
finding, of course, is clear evidence that the government did not
consistently apply any so-called policy. Cornelius itself indicates
that past use of the forum is evidence of the government's inten-
tion to designate it for expression.'" s Using the Cornelius selective
access test, however, it is impossible for any court to determine
whether or not only appropriate groups actually used the forum. A
court could only determine whether the government controlled ac-
cess in some manner; the court cannot evaluate the government's
success at permitting only appropriate groups to use the forum.
The court in Planned Parenthood used Chicago's failure to
dedicate its forum to only noncontroversial topics as evidence that
it dedicated the forum to all sorts of expression. The trial court
made a finding that past advertisements were controversial. The
trial court concluded that Chicago had accepted controversial ma-
terial such as political advertisements, a gun control message,
messages regarding AIDS, and messages espousing views on nu-
clear war posted by antiwar groups.104 Although these, seem like
controversial topics, CTA directly challenged the court's character-
ization of these advertisements and messages. The "gun control
message" was a public service reminder that a Chicago law re-
quired the registration of firearms by a certain deadline. The "nu-
clear war" message was apparently an ad quoting President Eisen-
hower's statement that making weapons takes resources from the
poor.'" The impact on appellate review is that the inference that a
particular subject is or is not controversial is always somewhat sus-
pect. It is also apparent that the most honest way to address this
issue is for the trial judge to provide a complete description of the
advertisement in his statement of facts, not just bare conclusions.
Perhaps an appellate court should more appropriately treat a find-
ing that something is controversial like the unprotected speech cat-
egory of pornography, which is always subject to independent
review.'06
103. 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3449 (1985).
104. Planned Parenthood Aas'n v. Chicago Transit Auth., 592 F. Supp. 544, 547, 550
(N.D. I11. 1984).
105. Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 16, Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985).
106. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography).
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The advantages of keeping the ultimate label "public forum" a
matter of law which is capable of further clarification can be seen
in this area. If courts established as a matter of law that the only
permissible subject-matter distinction is between political and
commercial advertising, then the trier of fact's job seems more
clear-cut. 07 The acceptance of any partisan political material
would be sufficient to turn the property into a public forum.'" The
trial court would not then be called upon to make the more ambig-
uous finding that a particular advertisement is in fact controver-
sial. Consequently, there may be less call to keep this sort of fac-
tual finding subject to independent appellate review.
The appropriate standard of review in this area should be con-
sistent with both the purpose of Rule 52(a)'s'09 clearly erroneous
standard and the reasons given in Bose for abandoning it. A trial
court draws an inference when it characterizes a forum's past use
as controversial, finds that the government had a policy of limiting
access, and that the government had consistently applied this se-
lective access policy. Although it involves the application of histor-
ical facts to these words which are themselves legal concepts, the
application is still closer to the historical facts than is an ultimate
fact.110 The circuits have historically varied greatly in their appli-
cation of Rule 52(a) to inferences drawn from essentially undis-
puted or documentary evidence. 11 A proposed change to Rule
52(a) explicitly emphasizes the need for finality and that the Rule
applies to documentary evidence.11' An original advisory note to
the Rule perhaps planted the seed of confusion by referring to
"modern federal equity practice" which allowed for de novo review
107. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (holding this to be a
constitutional subject-matter designation). The Court did not hold that this is the only per-
missible limitation in this context. See supra note 102.
108. See Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 896 n.6 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (acceptance of political advertising made subway a public forum); Penthouse
Int'l, Ltd. v. Koch, 599 F. Supp. 1338, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same).
109. FED. R. Cirv. P. 52(a).
110. "But the drawing of the inference is still the finding of a fact, and it is not to be
confused, as it frequently is, with a determination of the 'ultimate conclusion,' often called
the 'ultimate fact.'" Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A
Comparative Analysis, 58 H~Av. L. Rzv. 70, 94 (1944) (footnotes omitted).
111. C. WRIGHT, A MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACcCE AND PROCEDURE- CIVIL § 2587
(1983) [hereinafter cited as FEDEPL PRACTICE].
112. See Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), 98 F.R.D. 337, 359 (1983) ("Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly errone-
ous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the
credibility of the witnesses and to the need for finality.").
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of a judge's findings of fact.'13 Yet a later note by the Advisory
Committee criticized opinions which waived the clearly erroneous
standard. "4 The Court has itself been consistent in holding that
the Rule's clearly erroneous standard applies to these cases. '15
Our conclusion that the Rule has generally governed the scope
of review of inferences from historical facts poses problems in the
public forum area. The trial court infers that the government des-
ignated the forum for expression or that access was "selective."
Consequently, the appellate court should use the clearly erroneous
standard when it reviews these findings. Where the trial court
makes a crucial inference which leads it to conclude that the prop-
erty is not a public forum, the speech regulation need only be rea-
sonable.1 ' If the appellate court takes these findings as a given
and merely reapplies the reasonableness test, the regulation has
once again escaped serious scrutiny. In its public forum cases, the
Court has never struck down a regulation of speech as unreasona-
ble unless it considered the property a public forum. 117 The practi-
cal result is that speech is left very much unprotected when a regu-
lation need only be reasonable, in much the same way that
pornography and certain other categories of speech are left unpro-
tected and subject to regulation.1
It is this reasoning which likens the public forum label to a
category of unprotected speech-speech on government property
which is not a public forum-which brings forward Bose's reasons
for abandoning the clearly erroneous standard. When a court finds
speech to be pornography, government may prohibit it entirely.
The same is true when a court concludes that government property
is not a public forum. The Court in Bose reasoned that it must give
careful "case-by-case" consideration "in those cases involving re-
strictions on the freedom of speech protected by the First Amend-
ment, particularly in those cases in which it is contended that the
communication in issue is within one of the few classes of 'unpro-
113. See generally Comment, An Analysis of the Application of the Clearly Erroneous
Standard of Rule 52(o) to Findings of Fact in Federal Nonjury Cases, 53 Miss. LJ. 473
(1983).
114. See FEDzRAL PRAtICE, supra note 111.
115. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511-12 (1985); United
States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 194 n.9 (1963); United States v. Gypsum, 333 U.S.
364, 394 (1948).
116. See supra note 3.
117. Id.
118. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1960-61
(1984). See generally Farber & Nowak, supra note 2, at 1226-39 (tracing development of
categorical approach).
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tected' speech."'1 9 The Court has found that these general catego-
ries are simply not capable of precise enough definition to leave
the issue to the trier of fact for application of the legal standard.120
The actual malice standard likewise seems to be an indefinite
legal standard whose borders need constant policing. Yet the Court
has already refined the actual malice standard to mean knowledge
or reckless disregard for the truth.12' This elaboration of the gen-
eral standard resembles that in Cornelius, which held there to be
no designation where access was selective because the government
always limited participation to appropriate groups.' 2 In Bose the
ultimate dispute concerned whether the defendant had knowledge.
In discussing Rule 52(a) the Court itself said that it "surely does
not stretch the language of the rule to characterize an inquiry into
what a person knew at a given point in time as a question of
'fact.' "23 Indeed, one wonders what other conclusion is possible
given Pullman-Standard v. Swint's 24 holding that discriminatory
intent is a pure fact covered by the Rule's clearly erroneous stan-
dard. Both inquiries turn on the party's state of mind. Despite the
Court's statements in Bose that it was merely applying a general
legal category to historical facts, 28 it is more correct to conclude
that the Court conducted a full-scale independent review of the
pure fact or inference that the defendant had knowledge. The mo-
tive for such a thorough review was a desire to protect free expres-
sion. 26 The Court's explanation of what it was doing is less contro-
versial because it resembles the traditional dispute about ultimate
119. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1961.
120. "Providing triers of fact with a general description of the type of communication
whose content is unworthy of protection has not, in and of itself, served sufficiently to nar-
row the category, nor to eliminate the danger that decisions by triers of fact may inhibit the
expression of protected ideas." Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1962.
121. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See generally, Kalven, New
York Times Case, supra note 29.
122. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
123. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1958.
124. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 286-87 n.16 (1982). See supra note 83.
125. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1963-64 (citing Sullivan for the proposition that the Court
must make certain that the actual malice standard is correctly applied). See Monaghan,
supra note 86, at 231-32; see also Comment, The Expanding Scope of Appellate Review in
Libel Cases-The Supreme Court Abandons the Clearly Erroneous Standard of Review for
Findings of Actual Malice, 36 MERCER L. REv. 711, 727 (1985) ("[Tlhe Court in Bose ap-
plied the principle of independent appellate review to a finding of pure fact.").
126. Independent review is necessary "to preserve the precious liberties established and
ordained by the Constitution. The question whether the evidence in the record in a defama-
tion case is of the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First Amendment
protection is not merely a question for the trier of fact." Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1965.
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facts and the clearly erroneous standard. Yet by independently re-
viewing the pure fact or factual inference of knowledge, the Court
intrudes upon the trial court to a greater extent. The same solici-
tude for protecting the first amendment should urge that in the
public forum context appellate courts independently review the
findings where the trial court does not classify the property as a
public forum.""
VI. CONCLUSION
A federal judge in a bench trial must place the public forum
label in his conclusions of law. This much is not controversial. It is
absolutely essential, however, that he state the factual findings
which support his conclusion with precision, completeness, and
particularity. The most crucial findings are whether the govern-
ment traditionally exercised selective access, had a policy gov-
erning the property's use for expression, and consistently enforced
this policy. By providing a complete record of the historical facts, a
trial judge allows the appellate court to further refine exactly what
specific facts are necessary to support the public forum label. Only
by fully developing and explaining the historical facts can an ap-
pellate court meaningfully review the ultimate conclusion that the
property is a public forum. The difference in the protection af-
forded speech based upon this conclusion is simply too great to
leave certain crucial facts for review under the clearly erroneous
standard.
KEVIN Do~sz*
127. For a persuasive argument that other areas of constitutional law application
should receive independent review on a discretionary basis, see Monaghan, supra note 86.
* This article is dedicated to my father's memory and to my mother, Josephine Dorse,
with love.
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